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Abstract Recent research suggests that gorillas’ and
orangutans’ object representations survive cohesion viola-
tions (e.g., a split of a solid object into two halves), but that
their processing of quantities may be affected by them. We
assessed chimpanzees’ (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos’
(Pan paniscus) reactions to various fission events in the
same series of action tasks modelled after infant studies
previously run on gorillas and orangutans (Cacchione and
Call in Cognition 116:193–203, 2010b). Results showed
that all four non-human great ape species managed to
quantify split objects but that their performance varied as a
function of the non-cohesiveness produced in the splitting
event. Spatial ambiguity and shape invariance had the
greatest impact on apes’ ability to represent and quantify
objects. Further, we observed species differences with
gorillas performing lower than other species. Finally, we
detected a substantial age effect, with ape infants below
6 years of age being outperformed by both juvenile/ado-
lescent and adult apes.
Keywords Core knowledge  Object representation 
Cognitive development  Comparative cognition 
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Introduction
The core principle of cohesion (Spelke 1994; Spelke and
Kinzler 2007) is the most fundamental defining property of
the ontological category of objects (Bloom 2000; Pinker
1997; Scholl 2007). Core principles serve to build repre-
sentations of and reason about ecologically important events
and entities and are thus most likely shaped by natural
selection and shared by various primate (and probably even
other mammal) species (e.g., Cacchione and Call 2010a, b;
Cacchione and Krist 2004; Cacchione et al. 2009; Mendes
et al. 2008; Santos 2004). Recently, several studies con-
firmed that cohesion is fundamental to represent, track, and
reason about persisting objects because human infants’ and
adults’ as well as non-human primates’ object representa-
tions are affected after the perception of cohesion violations
(Cacchione and Call 2010b; Cheries et al. 2008; Chiang and
Wynn 2000; Huntley-Fenner et al. 2002; Mitroff et al. 2004;
Rosenberg and Carey 2006; van Marle and Scholl 2003). The
impact of cohesion violations was assessed with different
methodologies ranging from perceptual measures (i.e., the
violation of expectation paradigm, perceptual object tracking
studies) to action-based measures (i.e., forced choice crawl-
ing procedure, forced choice cup selection).
Particularly in human infants, perceiving the decompo-
sition of a solid object (e.g., by breaking it in two or more
pieces) had a major impact on their ability to represent its
continuous existence (Cheries et al. 2008; Chiang and
Wynn 2000). Chiang and Wynn (2000) compared with
8-month-old infants’ reasoning about solid objects and
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collections of objects such as non-cohesive piles of objects
(pyramids of blocks) in occlusion events using a violation of
expectation procedure. Infants saw one or two objects
moving behind a screen. The removal of the screen revealed
either a consistent event (expected number of objects) or an
inconsistent event (unexpected number of objects). Infants’
looking times to the outcomes were compared to see,
whether they detected the magical disappearance of some of
the objects. When infants were presented with solid pyra-
mids that maintained their boundaries throughout the whole
event, they succeeded in this task (i.e., looked longer if one
of the objects was missing). However, if infants first saw the
decomposition of the pyramid into five blocks and then their
rearrangement into a pyramid, they failed to track and
individuate the objects. Later, Cheries et al. (2008) showed
that even the most simple cohesion violation, the fission of a
single solid object into two parts affected infants’ ability to
represent and quantify objects. He used the so-called forced
choice crawling procedure where infants are presented with
cups being baited with different cracker amounts. Infants
are allowed to crawl to the cup of their preference (which in
young infants is always the cup containing the greater
amount of food). Infants presented with a single big cracker
that was split into two halves before placing it into the cup
failed to select the cup containing the greater amount
(which is what they did in an identical condition without a
splitting event). Obviously cohesion violations heavily
affect infants’ object representation at least up to the age of
16 month (see Cheries and Carey 2009); however, it is
unclear why this is the case. It is possible that (a) infants
conceive of split objects as of a non-object entity, (b) their
object representation is fully destroyed by observing the
cohesion violation, or (c) their initial representation sur-
vives the splitting, but is impaired and thus ineffective in
comparative judgments (Cheries et al. 2008; Chiang and
Wynn 2000). The last possibility is strongly supported by
the findings on human adults and non-human primates using
perceptual measures. Although adults’ object representa-
tions were limited in their function when tracked objects
split into two (Mitroff et al. 2004), their representation
clearly survived the splitting. Similarly, Mahajan et al.
(2009) reported that brown lemurs (Eulemur fulvus) suc-
cessfully enumerated objects that were decomposed into
multiple pieces in a violation of expectation paradigm.
Recently, Cacchione and Call (2010b) adopted the
Cheries et al. (2008) forced choice methodology to inves-
tigate orangutans’ and gorillas’ reactions to five splitting
events resulting in different amounts of non-cohesiveness
according to the following ranking (from high to low): (1)
smashing a cracker in one blow (transformed the solid
cracker into a substance and thus into a ‘‘non-object
entity’’) resulted in the highest degree of spatial ambiguity,
the disassembly occurred in a very short time and the
original objects’ shape was fully destroyed; (2) succes-
sively splitting the cracker in six small pieces also resulted
in high spatial ambiguity and destroyed the shape of the
original object, but the slow erosion facilitated the con-
servation of the object representation; (3) splitting the
cracker into two halves resulted in comparatively low
spatial ambiguity but affected the shape; (4) breaking off a
small edge and (5) breaking out the centre of the cracker
both produced a comparatively low spatial ambiguity and
preserved the original object’s shape (see Cacchione and
Call 2010b for a more detailed account of how these
manipulations result in different levels of cohesion). If
object cohesion is the main factor fostering the represen-
tation (and quantification) of solid objects, these abilities
should vary as a function of perceived object cohesion.
Cacchione and Call (2010b) found that the different
splitting events affected apes’ object representations but
did not destroy them. Orangutans and gorillas were able to
quantify crackers split into two identical halves or crackers
eroding slowly over time. They showed even higher rates
of success if the fission had a low impact on the objects’
outer contour (i.e., break off one edge and break out the
centre). Only if the cracker was fully fragmented (i.e.,
smashed) their quantifications eventually broke down.
However, their performance in this condition substantially
improved if the task demands were reduced by using a
larger proportionate difference between quantities to be
judged. Thus, the results strongly suggested that even
strong incidences of fission did not fully destroy apes’
object representations but limited their operational capa-
bility as it has been observed in human adults (Mitroff et al.
2004). This suggests that gorillas and orangutans also
manage to represent and quantify split objects.
The present studies aimed at reinforcing and extending
the original findings of Cacchione and Call (2010b) by
testing bonobos and chimpanzees and consequently com-
pleting this data set in the great apes. To allow for a direct
comparison between species, we tested chimpanzees and
bonobos with exactly the same design and procedure as
gorillas and orangutans in the original study. Would
chimpanzees and bonobos, just like orangutans and goril-
las, successfully represent and quantify split objects? The
investigation of multiple species closely related to humans
is of special interest to make strong inferences about the
distribution and evolution of this important core feature of
physical cognition. Specifically, potential species differ-
ences in great apes’ vulnerability to cohesion violations
would offer very important insights into the phylogenetic
history of apes’ capacity to perceive, represent, and reason
about physical objects.
Further, we investigated whether nonhuman great apes’
vulnerability to fission events also decreases during
ontogeny (as it has been observed in human infants).
2 Anim Cogn (2013) 16:1–10
123
Combining the data of all four species in this paradigm
created a sample size that enabled us to compare the per-
formance of infants (0–5 years), juveniles and adolescents
(6–14 years), and adults (15–35 years). Finally, we exam-
ined potential order effects in task administration. In the
original study, baseline condition and split-in-halves con-
dition were assessed first, followed by a set of four split
conditions resulting in varying degrees of non-cohesive-
ness. This might have influenced apes performance (e.g.,
downgraded their performance in the conditions that were
assessed first and vice versa). Thus, in the present study, we
tested a second subsample with a fully counterbalanced
design to assess potential order effects (Experiment 2).
Experiment 1
Methods
Participants
Twelve great apes (six chimpanzees [Pan troglodytes] and six
bonobos [Pan paniscus]) participated in the study (Table 1).
All apes were housed at the Wolfgang Ko¨hler Primate
Research Center (Leipzig zoo) in Germany. All had prior
experience with various experiments investigating physical
and social cognition. Four chimpanzees and four bonobos had
prior experience with an investigation on quantity-based
discriminations (see Hanus and Call 2007); three chimpan-
zees and four bonobos participated in an investigation on
liquid conservation (see Suda and Call 2004). Apes were
tested alone either in an indoor observation room or in their
sleeping room. Mothers with infants younger than 3 years of
age were tested in the company of their offspring.
Materials
The stimuli were pieces of wheat crispbread. They measured
6 cm 9 5.5 cm (big cracker, see Fig. 1 ‘‘initial presenta-
tion’’), 3 cm 9 5.5 cm, or 3 cm 9 2.7 cm, respectively
(small crackers, see Fig. 1 ‘‘comparison ratios 1:2 or 1:4’’).
To ensure that the single big cracker would split into two
exactly identical halves, the desired breaking line was pre-
carved on the backside of the cracker. This manipulation was
not visible to the participants. The crackers were placed into
two oblong opaque cups (9 cm diameter, 17 cm high). Once
the cracker pieces were placed into the cups, the apes could
not see them anymore.
Design and procedure
The ape sat behind a Plexiglas panel with two holes
through which s/he could point. A testing surface (slide
table) was fixed by a metal frame directly underneath the
panel, and the two cups were placed on top of it (58 cm
apart of each other) in front of the holes. The experimenter
sat in front of the slide table, which was constructed such
that its surface could be shifted back and forth. The
experimenter pulled the table back and baited the cups in
full view of the ape. Procedure and design were as
described in Cacchione and Call (2010b). The apes were
presented with two conditions, a split-in-halves condition
and a baseline condition where the objects were not split
(no-split condition). Each condition consisted of 1 session
Table 1 Age [years], sex [M = male, F = female] and distribution into the three age classes [1 = infant (0–5 years), 2 = juvenile/adolescent
(6–14 years), 3 = adult (15–35 years)] of the participating subjects
Experiment 1/2 Experiment 2 Cacchione and Call (2010b)
Sex Age Age class Sex Age Age class Sex Age Age class
Bonobos Chimpanzees Orangutans
Joey M 26 3 Robert M 33 3 Bimbo M 28 3
Limbuko M 14 2 Frodo M 15 3 Dunja F 35 3
Kuno M 12 2 Patrick M 12 2 Pini F 20 3
Kuno F 16 3 Lome M 8 2 Dokana F 19 3
Yasa F 12 2 Lobo M 5 1 Padana F 10 3
Luiza F 4 1 Kofi M 4 1 Gorillas
Chimpanzees Fraukje F 33 3 Bebe F 29 3
Alex M 8 2 Riet F 31 3 Viringika F 13 2
Alexandra F 10 2 Natascha F 29 3 Kibara F 4 1
Annett F 10 2 Dorien F 28 3
Gertruida F 16 3 Tai F 7 2
Jahaga F 16 3 Kara F 4 1
Fifi F 16 3
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with 6 trials. In the split-in-halves condition, the experi-
menter held out a single big cracker (see Fig. 1, ‘‘initial
presentation’’) and broke it in two identical halves before
placing it into a cup. The other cup was baited with a
cracker of only half (comparison ratio 1:2) or a quarter
(comparison ratio 1:4) of the size the original single big
cracker. To prevent biasing the subject by stimulus
enhancement, the smaller cracker amount was always
handled in a similar manner (i.e., grasping it alternately
with both hands) and for an equal amount of time before
placing it into the cup. After the baiting, the experimenter
pushed the sliding table to the panel. The ape could now
point at the cup of his/her choice. The experimenter drew
the table back again and handed over the content of the
chosen cup to the ape. The no-split condition was identical
to the split-in-halves condition, except that apes never
witnessed the splitting, but they were directly presented
with two identical cracker halves. The experimenter did not
place the crackers into the cup unless the apes watched her
doing so. Condition (split-in-halves condition and no-split
condition), cup ratio (1:2 and 1:4), side (larger amount of
food in the left or right cup), and order of presentation
(larger amount of food placed first or second) were coun-
terbalanced across participants.
Data scoring and analysis
We videotaped all trials and scored them live on coding
sheets. A second observer scored a random sample of 20 %
of the trials. Inter-observer reliability was high (index of
concordance = .99, kappa = .98, n = 116). Data analysis
was done with Excel 2003 for Windows and SPSS 14.0,
using nonparametric statistics.
Results
Apes selected the larger of two quantities above chance in all
conditions (Wilcoxon test: split 1:2: z = -3.103; no-split
1:2: z = -2.976; split 1:4: z = -3.274; no-split 1:4: z =
-3.217; p \ .01 in all cases; Fig. 2). Overall, there was no
significant difference between the split-in-halves condition
and the no-split condition (Wilcoxon test: z = -1.173,
p = .241). Similarly, there were no differences between
conditions in the first trial (Sign test: 1:2: p = .625; 1:4:
p = 1.000) and no differences between conditions within
each ratio (Wilcoxon test: 1:2: z = -1.174, p = .240; 1:4:
z = -.378, p = .705). However, apes performed reliably
better for a cup ratio 1:4 (Wilcoxon test: z = -2.675,
p \ .01). Finally, there was no evidence of learning in the
course of the conditions, assessed by comparing the first three
trials with the second three trials (Wilcoxon test: split 1:2:
z = -.276; no-split 1:2: z = -.851; split 1:4: z = -1.342;
no-split 1:4: z = -.577; p [ .05 for all cases).
Species comparisons
Comparing the overall performance of the chimpanzees and
bonobos in the present study with the orangutans and gorillas
of Cacchione and Call (2010b) revealed species differences in
both test conditions (Kruskal–Wallis Test: split: v2 = 7.935;
no-split: v2 = 10.659; p \ .05, df = 3 in both cases). These
differences were due to the lower performance of gorillas in
Fig. 1 Schematic depiction of stimuli used in Experiments 1–2
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the split condition as compared to orangutans (Mann–Whit-
ney U test: z = -2.249, p \ .05), and to the lower perfor-
mance of gorillas in both split and no-split conditions as
compared to chimpanzees (Mann–Whitney U test: split:
z = -2.364; no-split: z = -2.384; p \ .05 in both cases)
and to bonobos (Mann–Whitney U test: split: z = -2.364;
no-split: z = -2.092; p \ .05 in both cases).
Discussion
Chimpanzees and bonobos were able to represent and quan-
tify amounts of solid objects that were split into two halves.
That is, as was earlier observed in gorillas and orangutans,
their object representations clearly survived fission-type
cohesion violations. Moreover, chimpanzees and bonobos
even showed higher rates of correct performance than gorillas.
The next experiment investigated chimpanzees’ and bonobos’
reactions to variants of fission events that either increased or
decreased an object’s non-cohesiveness as compared to a split
in halves. Again their responses were compared to the
orangutans and gorillas of the original study. Additionally, we
assessed age effects by comparing the performance of dif-
ferent ages. Finally, a sample of chimpanzees was tested with
all the conditions of Experiments 1 and 2 in a fully counter-
balanced order to investigate potential order effects.
Experiment 2
Methods
Participants and materials
The same great apes as in Experiment 1 also participated in
Experiment 2. Additionally, a sample of 12 naı¨ve
chimpanzees was tested with the conditions counterbalanced
(Table 1). All had prior experience with various experiments
investigating physical and social cognition. Five had prior
experience with an investigation on quantity-based discrimi-
nations (see Hanus and Call 2007); one had participated in an
investigation on liquid conservation (see Suda and Call 2004).
Again all materials were made out of pieces of crispbread. In
addition to the two opaque cups, one transparent cup was used
to present the cracker after the smash manipulation (before
filling it into the opaque cup, see below).
Design and procedure
Again design and procedure were the same as in Cacchione
and Call (2010b). Apes were confronted with two cups. In
one cup, the experimenter filled the big cracker that was
manipulated/split. The second cup was baited with a
cracker of only half (comparison ratio 1:2) or a quarter
(comparison ratio 1:4) of the size the original big cracker
(see Fig. 1). Instead of splitting the single big cracker into
two identical halves, the apes now were presented with four
new types of splitting manipulations producing varying
degrees of non-cohesiveness (from high to low; see Fig. 1):
(1) smashing the cracker into crumbs, (2) successively
splitting the cracker in six parts, (3) breaking out of the
centre of the cracker, and (4) breaking off one small edge
of the cracker (see Fig. 1). In the smash condition, the
experimenter held out the single big cracker (see Fig. 1,
‘‘initial presentation’’) and then crushed it by closing her
hand. Then, she opened the hand again and filled the
resulting cracker crumbs into a transparent cup. After that
she poured the content of the transparent cup in full view of
the ape into the opaque cup. In the succession condition,
the experimenter held out a big cracker and successively
broke it into six small pieces. Each of the pieces was
directly placed into the cup after it was broken off the
original cracker. Thus, the cracker appeared to be gradually
melting down. In the centre condition, a circle was broken
out of the centre of the big cracker. Thus, the cracker was
again split into two halves, but the outer contour remained
unchanged. In the edge condition, only a small edge was
broken off the big cracker. Again, in contrast to the split-in-
halves condition of Experiment 1, the original cracker
largely preserved its shape through the fission event. To
prevent effects of stimulus enhancement, the smaller
cracker amount was handled in a similar manner (i.e.,
grasping it alternately with both hands) and for an equal
amount of time before placing it into the cup.
All apes received two blocks (ratio 1:2 and ratio 1:4)
with four conditions. All apes first received a block with a
ratio 1:4 followed by a block with a ratio 1:2. Over both
blocks, the conditions were administered in a quasi-ran-
domized fashion (e.g., block 1: edge-centre-succession-
Fig. 2 Per cent of correct choices in Experiment 1 (‘‘no-split’’ and
‘‘split-in-halves’’ conditions), for cup amounts differing by a ratio 1:2
and 1:4
Anim Cogn (2013) 16:1–10 5
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smash; block 2: smash-succession-centre-edge). Each
condition consisted of six trials. Again side and order of
presentation were counterbalanced across participants.
Additionally, a sample of 12 chimpanzees was tested
with all the events of Experiments 1 and 2 in a fully
counterbalanced manner. They too were presented with
two ratio blocks (ratio 1:2 and 1:4) and six conditions (joint
Experiments 1 and 2) but the order of conditions and ratios
were fully counterbalanced among the participants. It is
possible that the order of conditions influenced apes’ per-
formance in the original design in that they might have
performed better in conditions they received later because
they acquired learning set experience. We hypothesized
thus that if the order of conditions affected the perfor-
mance, apes receiving the fully counterbalanced design
should perform (1) higher in the split and no-split condi-
tions, (2) lower in the centre, edge, succession, and smash
conditions, and (3) higher in tasks with a ratio 1:4 than the
apes of the original design.
Results
Figure 3 presents the percentage of trials in which subjects
selected the larger quantity of crackers. Apes failed to
select the larger quantity in the smash condition when cups
differed by a ratio 1:2 (Wilcoxon test: z = -1.469,
p = .142). However, they chose above chance level in all
other conditions (Wilcoxon test: smash 1:4: z = -3.357;
succession 1:2: z = -2.873; succession 1:4: z = -3.357;
edge 1:2: z = -3.274; edge 1:4: z = -3.464; centre 1:2:
z = -3.274; centre 1:4: z = -3.464; p \ .01; see Fig. 3).
Effects of condition: overall performance
Overall, apes’ performance across conditions reliably dif-
fered (Friedman test: v2 = 22.06, df = 3, p \ .001,
N = 12). Apes performed reliably better in the succession
condition, the centre condition, and the edge condition than
in the smash condition (Wilcoxon test: succession: z =
-2.143; edge: z = -2.770; centre: z = -2.821, p \ .05 in
all cases). Also, apes performed better in the centre and
edge conditions than in the succession condition (Wilcoxon
test: z = -2.041, p \ .05 in both cases) while their per-
formance in the centre and edge condition did not differ
(Wilcoxon test: z = 0, p = 1.0). In general, apes per-
formed reliably better in both events with decreased non-
cohesiveness than in the split-in-halves condition of
Experiment 1 (Wilcoxon test: z = -2.207, p \ .05 in both
cases). However, comparing events with increased non-
cohesiveness to the split-in-halves condition of Experiment
1 revealed that apes only performed reliably lower in the
smash condition but not in the succession condition (Wilcoxon
test: smash: z = -2.138, p \ .05; succession: z = -.140,
p = .888).
Effects of condition: performance within each ratio
Also within a ratio 1:2, apes’ performance differed between
conditions (Friedman test: v2 = 22.06, df = 3, p \ .001,
N = 12). This difference was not apparent for a ratio 1:4
(Friedman test: v2 = 2.00, df = 3, p = .572, N = 12).
Effects of condition: first trial performance
There was a reliable difference in the first trial between the
centre and smash conditions when cup amounts differed by
a ratio 1:2 (Sign test: p \ .05). In all other cases, there
were no differences between conditions in the first trial
(Sign test: p [ .07 in all cases).
Effects of ratio
The apes overall reliably more often selected the larger
amount for a ratio 1:4 (Wilcoxon test: z = -2.952, p \ .01).
Training effects
There was no evidence that subjects improved performance
during testing assessed by comparing the first three trials
with the second three trials (Wilcoxon test: succession 1:2:
z = -.949; succession 1:4: z = -1.000; smash 1:2: z =
-.241; smash 1:4: z = -1.000; edge 1:2: z = -.447; edge
1:4: z = .000; centre 1:2: z = 1.000; centre 1:4: z = .000;
p [ .05 in all cases).
Fig. 3 Per cent of correct choices in Experiment 2 (‘‘successive
splitting’’, ‘‘smash to crumbs’’, ‘‘break off edge’’ and ‘‘break out
centre’’ conditions) for cup amounts differing by a ratio 1:2 and 1:4
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Species comparisons
Comparing the overall performance of chimpanzees and
bonobos in the present study with the orangutans and gorillas
revealed species differences in the smash and the edge con-
ditions (Kruskal–Wallis Test: smash: v2 = 8.987; edge: z =
7.912; p \ .05, df = 3 in both cases). These differences were
mainly due to gorillas’ lower performance in the edge condi-
tion as compared to chimpanzees (Mann–Whitney U test: z =
-2.121, p \ .05) and orangutans’ and chimpanzees’ lower
performance in the smash condition as compared to bonobos
(Mann–Whitney U test, orangutan/bonobo: z = -2.592;
chimpanzee/bonobo: z = -2.445; p \ .05 in both cases).
Age effects
There were age differences in the split-in-halves, the no-split,
the centre and the edge conditions (Kruskal–Wallis Test,
split: v2 = 6.023; no-split: v2 = 8.305; center: v2 = 6.690;
edge: v2 = 9.570; p \ .05, df = 2 in all cases), whereas
performance did not differ in the smash and in the succession
condition (Kruskal–Wallis Test: smash: v2 = .222; succes-
sion: v2 = 3.151, p [ .05, df = 2) (see Fig. 4). Infants per-
formed worse than juveniles (Mann–Whitney U test: split:
z = -2.330; no-split: z = -2.974; centre: z = -2.616;
edge: z = -3.118; p \ .05 in all cases) and adults (Mann–
Whitney U test: split: z = -2.007; no-split: z = -2.305;
edge: z = -2.198; p \ .05 in all cases). In contrast, the
performance of juveniles and adults did not differ. Never-
theless, infants still performed above chance in all conditions
(Wilcoxon test: split: z = -2.032; no-split: z = -2.023;
smash: z = -2.023; succession: z = -2.032; centre: z =
-2.032; edge: z = -2.070; p \ .05 in all cases).
Order effects
We compared the performance of the chimpanzees with the
fully counterbalanced design with the chimpanzees of the
original design (n = 6). Comparing the overall perfor-
mance of the two samples tested with different designs
(original design vs. fully counterbalanced design) revealed
that chimpanzees tested with the fully counterbalanced
design performed reliably lower in the edge condition
(Mann–Whitney U test: edge: z = -2.501; p \ .05) but
reliably better in conditions where cup amounts differed by
a ratio 1:4 (Mann–Whitney U test: z = -2.133, p \ .05).
In all other conditions/ratios, they did not differ.
Discussion
Apes generally performed well in all test events. They
performed above chance in all conditions except in the
smash condition where they failed to quantify amounts of a
cracker that was smashed into crumbs before filling it into
the cup. However, this effect was only observed if cup
amounts differed by a ratio 1:2, but not in the easier 1:4
version of the task. In the smash condition, the cracker
piece was fully fragmented, and fragmentation occurred in
a very short time period, both factors handicap the con-
servation of the object representation through fission.
However, even in the face of this strong interference, apes’
representations were not fully destroyed, since the apes
succeeded with a ratio 1:4. Although performing well,
apes’ performance was obviously influenced by the degree
of non-cohesiveness produced in the different splitting
events. This confirms that apes’ ability to represent and
quantify may indeed be affected by fission events. Further,
also in the present study, the proportionate ratio between
cup contents influenced apes’ behaviour which confirms
the previous finding that quantity judgements involving
higher ratios are more difficult to solve for great apes and
other non-human primate species (Addessi et al. 2008;
Beran 2001, 2004, 2010; Beran and Beran 2004; Beran
et al. 2009; Hanus and Call 2007; Lewis et al. 2005; van
Marle et al. 2006).
Overall, chimpanzees and bonobos tested in the present
study performed similar as the orangutans and gorillas
tested in Cacchione and Call (2010b). Just like orangutans
and gorillas, chimpanzees and bonobos also performed best
if the splitting had only low impact on object cohesion
(e.g., edge, centre) and worst if the splitting heavily vio-
lated object cohesion (e.g., smash). Moreover, their per-
formance in the split-in-halves and the succession
conditions was intermediate. Again, we observed some
species differences, most of them were connected to the
lower performance of gorillas in contrast to the other 3
species tested. Furthermore, we observed substantial age
differences with infants performing reliably worse than
juveniles/adolescents and adults. Infants performed worse
than the other two age groups in the majority of tasks
(including the no-split baseline). One exception was the
Fig. 4 Comparison of the performance of the three different age
classes (numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants in
each age class)
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two split events that produced the most non-cohesiveness.
These differences are further addressed in the general
discussion.
Finally, comparing the performance of chimpanzees
tested either with the original or with a fully counterbal-
anced design revealed overall performance differences in
the edge condition and for a 1:4 ratio. The better overall
performance of the fully counterbalanced group in the edge
task and their lower performance for a 1:4 ratio might be a
consequence of test order effects in the original design.
Thus, at least in these two cases, order effects may have
contributed to the good performance of apes tested with the
original design. However, both samples of chimpanzees
performed over 90 % correct in the edge task and thus
showed higher rates of success than in all other conditions.
Likewise, both samples of chimpanzees performed over
90 % correct for a 1:4 ratio and thus better than for a 1:2
ratio. This suggests that even if the original design very
slightly overestimated the succession rate of the apes in
these cases, the overall performance pattern was the same.
However, there is one important alternative explanation
that must be ruled out. It is possible that the apes found the
highly damaged cracker in the smash 1:2 condition simply
less appealing. In this case, apes might have been perfectly
able to quantify the smashed cracker, but did nevertheless
fail to select the bigger amount, because of an intrinsic
preference for undamaged (whole) crackers.
Experiment 3
Under specific circumstances, apes have been found to
depart from the usual food maximizing rule and show a
preference for smaller whole amounts over larger frac-
tionated amounts of food (see e.g., Beran et al. 2009). To
rule out the possibility that apes’ performance in the smash
1:2 ratio is best explained by apes’ preference for a smaller
(ratio 1:2) but not a too small (ratio 1:4) whole cracker over
a larger highly fragmented cracker, we ran the following
control. Apes were presented with a large cracker that was
inserted into an accurately fitting square plastic form. The
experimenter then smashed the cracker by repeatedly
pressing her fingers (index and thumb) on it. Although the
cracker was obviously highly fragmented, it preserved its’
original form (i.e., the remaining pieces were held in shape
by the plastic form). Thereby, we kept effects on the
crackers’ cohesion low. A second similar form was filled
with a cracker of only half the size. The cracker amounts
were not covered but presented in full view (in order to rule
out effects of representation). If apes simply had an
intrinsic preference for the undamaged cracker in the
smash ratio 1:2 condition, they should again fail to select
the larger cracker above chance level.
Methods
Participants and materials
Five chimpanzees and five bonobos that already partici-
pated in Experiments 1 and 2 also participated in Experi-
ment 3 (two additional apes could not be tested: Limbuko
moved to a new housing; Annett failed to participate in the
test; see Table 1).
Design and procedure
The procedure was identical to the one used in the main
test conditions, except that the cracker amounts were not
covered but presented in full view.
Results and discussion
Apes chose the larger damaged cracker in 77 % of trials
(Wilcoxon test: z = -2.345, p \ .05). This is marginally
different from their performance in the smash 1:2 condition
(Wilcoxon test: z = -1.869, p \ .06) and suggests that the
apes do not generally avoid smashed crackers for a ratio
1:2 comparisons. Thus, if the effects on shape are kept low
and apes must not compare the cup amounts on the base of
their representations, they successfully quantify also highly
damaged crackers. However, the comparatively low per-
formance in this task indicates that a weak tendency to
avoid highly fragmented crackers may be present in the
apes. Although this tendency appears too weak to explain
the observed response pattern in the smash ratio 1:2 con-
dition, it cannot be excluded that it exacerbated apes’
already low performance.
General discussion
Chimpanzees and bonobos were able to quantify split solid
objects in the context of various fission events. They were
able to quantify crackers split into two identical halves,
crackers eroding slowly over time and they performed even
better if only a small edge was broken off or the centre was
broken out of the original cracker. This confirms the findings
of the Cacchione and Call (2010b) study and broadens the
empirical base for the claim that great apes’ object repre-
sentations are highly robust in the context of fission events.
Similar to brown lemurs and 16-month-old human children,
but unlike 12-month-old human infants, great apes represent
and quantify a solid cracker that was split into two halves. In
contrast to brown lemurs (Mahajan et al. 2009), great apes
were tested with an action design modelled after the infant
study of Cheries and Carey (2009) and their performance is
thus directly comparable to findings in human infants.
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Moreover, the present study confirms the finding that
great apes’ ability to represent and quantify split solid
objects varies as a function of non-cohesiveness produced by
the different splitting events. Apes were more likely to
correctly assess quantities in fission events with a low
impact on object cohesion (e.g., centre and edge conditions),
whereas they had greater difficulty to correctly judge
quantities if the splitting heavily affected object cohesion
(e.g., smash). The main reason why centre and edge condi-
tions posed the lowest difficulty on apes’ quantification was
likely their low impact on the objects outer contour (i.e.,
boundedness). In both cases, the objects shape was almost
unaffected. Further, in both cases, the split resulted in only
two objects, and thus, spatial ambiguity was comparably
low. In contrast, smashing the cracker posed the greatest
challenge to apes’ ability to represent and quantify because
the splitting fully destroyed the shape of the object and
resulted in many small parts which increased the spatial
ambiguity. Thus, spatial ambiguity and shape invariance
were the two dimensions with the greatest impact on apes’
ability to represent and quantify objects in the present study.
Both factors increase non-cohesiveness and produce high
cost for the ability to track objects (Chiang and Wynn 2000;
van Marle and Scholl 2003). Only little evidence was found
for a further factor potentially affecting apes’ performance
in the present study. While earlier investigations found an
intrinsic preference for undamaged (whole) crackers in
events where cup amounts do not strongly differ, this ten-
dency did not reliably influence apes cup selection in the
present study. If the effects on shape were kept low and there
was no need to compare the cup amounts on the base of their
representation, apes succeeded in quantifying also highly
damaged crackers for a ratio 1:2. Although a tendency to
avoid smashed crackers may have contributed to apes’ low
performance in the smash condition, this tendency was
evidentially not substantial enough to explain their failure in
the smash 1:2 condition.
Apes’ object representations never broke down com-
pletely. The apes never lost object permanence after
experiencing cohesion violations, and when the task
demands were reduced (i.e., tasks involving a larger pro-
portionate difference), they even managed to quantify a
strongly fragmented cracker. A fully counterbalanced
design suggests that the original design may have slightly
overestimated apes’ success rate in the edge task and for a
1:4 ratio, but corroborates a basic overall performance
pattern. Taken together, these findings confirm the results
of Cacchione and Call (2010b) that even strong incidences
of fission do not destroy apes’ object representations but
most likely limit their processing capacity as it has also
been shown in human adults (Mitroff et al. 2004).
We observed some species differences, most of them
connected to the lower performance of gorillas in contrast
to the other species tested, a pattern that has also been
observed in other cognitive tasks (e.g., Amici et al. 2008).
Other tasks, however, have not found a clear difference
between gorillas and the other great apes. For instance,
gorillas are as proficient as the other apes using tools (e.g.,
Girndt et al. 2008; Mulcahy et al. 2005) or making infer-
ences about the location of objects (Call 2007; Mendes
et al. 2008). Tasks on object individuation or object per-
manence are particularly interesting in connection to the
current results because they rely on subjects’ ability to
track object identity despite spatio-temporal transforma-
tions (Scholl 2007). In such tasks, unlike the results of
object fission, no clear-cut species differences have been
detected.
We also observed substantial age effects on perfor-
mance, with infants below 6 years of age being outper-
formed by both juveniles/adolescents and adults. However,
age differences disappeared in the two splitting events that
produced the most non-cohesiveness (smash and succes-
sion), an outcome due to the older apes’ poor performance
in those conditions. How does this compare to the onto-
genetic shift that is observed in human infants from 12 to
16 months of age? Recall that 12-month-olds fail to
quantify a cracker that was split into two identical halves,
whereas 16-month-olds succeed. Thus, both human and
nonhuman great apes seem to undergo an ontogenetic shift
in object cognition. However, in contrast to 12-month-old
human infants, the youngest apes did not totally fail to
quantify the crackers after fission. But the youngest apes
tested were 4 years old, which is about the youngest age
that can be tested when multiple conditions are presented in
succession. This means that we do not know how even
younger apes would react, for example, whether they
would also completely fail to quantify split crackers. Fur-
ther, in contrast to human infants, young apes also per-
formed relatively poorly in a condition where no splitting
occurred (no-split condition). It is thus possible that the
observed improvement over time has its roots in a general
increase of attentional and executive control rather than
more specifically focused on a vulnerability to fission.
Additional research is needed to better understand these
developmental changes.
In sum, the present findings confirm that while cohesion
violations may affect apes’ representational abilities, they
do not destroy their representations of persisting objects.
Instead, the impact of fission on the representation of solid
objects is a function of their power to increase non-cohe-
siveness and mainly connected to degree of resulting spa-
tial ambiguity and the extent to which the shape of the
original object is changed through fission. As in humans,
we also observed an ontogenetic shift with juveniles and
adults outperforming infants below 6 years of age. How-
ever, future research must further explore why this shift
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occurs in great apes and whether it is (as it is in human
infants) connected to the decrease of vulnerability to fission
events during cognitive development.
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